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I am an academic historian whose interests lie in what is called the ‘early modern’. 
That is the period between about 1500 and 1800, during which important social and cultural 
transitions occurred. My last project before I retire is called Promoting modern mental 
health through the lessons of history. That involves podcasts, photo exhibitions, and talks in 
all sorts of non-academic locations, to reach a diverse range of audiences, from mental 
health professionals to prisoners, schoolchildren to service users. 
As an academic historian I have constantly to remind myself that what we live with 
in the present was once in the future. We have inherited the consequences of decisions, 
some of which were made two centuries ago. Studying history helps us to understand why 
we have the institutions and attitudes that we have. More recently, we operate in the 
shadow of a broad trend that sits under the umbrella term of ‘anti-psychiatry’. This 
proposes that psychiatry was much more than a medical specialty born out of 
humanitarianism and nineteenth century philanthropy. Rather, it was a mechanism for 
controlling deviant populations and was driven by the economic interests of nascent 
capitalism. French materialist philosopher Michel Foucault (1961/2006) is well known, 
German sociologist Klaus Dörner (1969/1981) less so. The views of both have been 
popularised in English since the 1970s by sociologist Andy Scull, whose Madness: a very 
short introduction (2011) encapsulates his sceptical ideas, including the anti-capitalist 
critique of ‘big pharma’.  
Interpretations of history very quickly settle into received wisdom. As an historian, 
my job is to revise and reinterpret. In this essay, I shall pick out some of the myths about 
history that serve to legitimate modern practices, while denigrating those of the past. I shall 
also highlight some of the more accurate perceptions that serve instead to enlighten and to 
facilitate change.  
Several mental health history myths can be categorised as examples of “pastism”: 
that is, the notion that everything in the past was bad, weird, or confused. One of the most 
prominent of these is the idea that people with mental illnesses were mistaken for witches 
right up until the 18th century. Between 1500 and 1700 tens of thousands of people, mostly 
but not exclusively women, were executed for using knowledge of the occult to do harm. 
The tough thing for us to accept is that belief in witchcraft among 16th and 17th people was, 
to them, quite rational. But they also appreciated that some people suffered from mental 
disorders. So madness and magic sat alongside each other, but they were quite distinct. 
James VI and I followed Renaissance orthodoxy when he explained that witches were 
cunning, powerful, focused, and successful. Melancholy people, by contrast, were seen as 
sad, vulnerable, chaotic, and weak. Often touted as a voice of rationality in an irrational age, 
the Elizabethan writer Reginald Scot accepted that there were both witches and mad 
people: he suggested that sometimes it was possible to misidentify certain examples. Early 
modern people were not confused; they just inhabited a different mental world that found 
a place for insanity and the occult. 
A similar confusion between the psychiatric and the spiritual informs the belief that 
people used physical interventions such as trepanation for religious reasons. Some 
ethnographers hypothesise that this procedure was performed in early societies to let out 
evil spirits, which were thought to be the cause of madness. This features in just about every 
history of psychiatry broadcast or website: I’ve even heard it on Melvyn Bragg’s In Our Time 
radio programme, usually a paragon of intellectual rigour. There is, in fact, no evidence at all 
in British history, of surgery to release bad spirits or devils; all known trepanations were to 
relieve the intracranial pressure associated with head injuries.  
One of the most persistent examples of “pastism” is the belief that people were put 
in asylums simply because they were inconvenient. Widespread institutionalisation of 
patients, especially paupers, began around 1800 and reached its peak a century and a half 
later when 150,000 people in England and Wales were institutionalised for a wide range of 
mental disorders, which nowadays hardly exist (general paresis of the insane), are managed 
in specialist facilities (severe learning disabilities) or treated in the community (like 
psychoses). Some sociologists see 19th century asylums as “warehouses of the unwanted”, 
convenient dumping grounds for inconvenient people who just did not fit in with needs of 
modern economies and societies (Scull, 1993:372). A variation on this claim is that husbands 
who could afford to pay a sympathetic doctor or madhouse keeper could have their wives 
put away with no just cause. A third variation on the “warehouses of the unwanted” line is 
that unmarried women were dumped in asylums because they had illegitimate children. 
There were only a few dozen cases like that in all the Scottish asylums of the Victorian 
period, during which tens of thousands of illegitimate children were born; institutionalised 
unmarried mothers had borne children and they suffered either from a pre-existing mental 
disorder, or one that was post-partum: they were not there simply because they were 
thought immoral by the standards of the day.  
There is, however, a measure of truth in the “warehouses of the unwanted” 
approach. First, until the early 20th century almost all asylum admissions were involuntary. 
Second, the lack of effective drug treatments meant length of stay was much longer than in 
most modern in-patient facilities (years rather than weeks). But that is not the whole story. 
For one thing, it was quite difficult to get into an asylum. Families usually had to petition, 
backed up by an affidavit from a doctor and/or magistrate. Medical superintendents had to 
decide who to admit, based on an assessment of the patient’s condition and the chances 
that a stay in an institution would help them. There were always far more applications for 
admission than there were places. Psychiatrists prided themselves not on incarcerating and 
forgetting, but treating and then discharging those they had cured. Private asylum keepers, 
of whom there were many prior to the early 20th century, ran commercial enterprises and 
they were keen to preserve their reputations, both by being discreet and by ensuring 
admissions were sanctioned by all interested parties. Patients and their families used the 
asylums for help and they negotiated their way through them: admission, discharge, 
readmission, and so on. They had active agency rather than being submissive recipients. 
Some psychiatrists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century argued that 
being in an asylum was bad for people with mental health problems. Patients discharged to 
the care of their families were, however, commonly readmitted sooner or later. Multiple 
attempts to relocate patients in families and communities show the desire of physician 
superintendents to cure and discharge, but also the fragility of sufferers when faced with 
the outside world. What may be the oldest voluntary group dealing specifically with mental 
health in Britain, now known as Together, was founded as the Mental After-Care Association 
in 1879 by the chaplain of Colney Hatch Lunatic Asylum in north London. He recognised the 
problems of supporting people leaving the institution, once they returned to the 
community.  
 
This brings us to the phenomenon of positive “pastism”: the view that things were 
better in bygone days. It is difficult to sustain the idea that everything was bad when we 
appreciate the remarkable diversity of past practices of care. For example, historic therapies 
were holistic. Each individual was treated as quite distinct from any other, even when they 
displayed similar signs and symptoms. Medicine was an integrated system where mind and 
body were connected and where discrete psychiatric categories did not exist. Thus medical 
practice meant taking into account all sorts of personal information, which might bear on 
achieving a successful outcome. Influences included the conjunction of stars at birth, 
occupation, religious leanings, and lifestyle. This is especially important because one of the 
things that doing podcast interviews with specialist clinicians has taught me is that therapies 
over the last 20-30 years have moved away from a one-size-fits-all approach to treatment, 
part of the continuing reaction against bio-reductionism. This is an example where we can 
learn directly from history, through a more balanced appreciation of past understandings 
and practices. 
Contrary to what some might think, the prominence of law in medical practice is not 
a recent development. For centuries the ultimate power to decide on a person’s treatment 
lay with their immediate family. Where necessary, courts of law reinforced this control. 
Ultimate control over whether a person was mentally capable of managing their own affairs 
and the completely separate issue of whether they should be compelled to live in a medical 
institution, also lay with law courts. Indeed, until the emergence of modern professional 
bureaucracies in the Victorian age, people used courts extensively to structure their lives, 
organise their communities, and resolve their disputes. Additionally, for centuries, 
developments in mental healthcare have owed much to the political complexion of 
governments. In the early and mid-19th century permissive and then compulsory legislation 
to build county asylums and, in the late nineteenth and early 20th century, legislation 
tightening up supervisory powers came out of interventionist, left-leaning administrations. 
In contrast, right-leaning governments were prominent in decarceration from the 1950s to 
the 1980s, where the desire to save money was an important driving force. Understanding 
local politics is also vital in explaining both the building and reform of institutions in 
particular places at specific times. 
Did science only came to psychiatry in the mid-20th century? This is a more complex 
question than it looks. The introduction of functional imaging and genetics, and the promise 
of personalised medication does not mean there was no science in psychiatry. In the later 
17th century, doctors picked up the language of nerves, which came to replace humoral 
theories of the workings of body and mind. In the 19th century the brain came to be the 
focus of research, seen as the organ of the mind. To penetrate the brain without surgery, 
theories emerged such as physiognomy (the characteristics of the face gave an insight into 
personality) and phrenology (the brain had localized, specific functions, which could be 
“read” from studying the skull). While we now regard these as ‘pseudo-sciences’, they were 
scientifically mainstream during the 19th century and very popular with the general public. 
While their underlying assumptions are long discredited, they show that psychiatry in the 
past had a better image, when more actively in tune with scientific advances. 
Putting the science to one side, what about the therapeutic relationship? Most 
histories of psychiatry adopt a teleological approach, writing off the supposedly bad and 
looking for the roots of what is modern and good. Moral therapy is an excellent example, 
featuring in all the recent psychiatric textbooks I’ve examined. It was indeed the precursor 
of many of the approaches, which modern medical professionals view as best practice. 
Moral treatment emphasized three things: the need for a benign environment in care; the 
therapeutic value of being usefully occupied at work or play; and the importance of the 
verbal relationship between therapist and sufferer. It was not, however, a product of the 
18th century Enlightenment. Moral therapy had its roots in centuries-old traditions of 
religious healing: what 17th century people called “spiritual physic”. It was based on talking. 
Religious belief was ubiquitous in societies until relatively recently and people often tried to 
explain their mental turmoil in religious terms, not because it was exclusively religious, but 
because the experience of spiritual turmoil provided an accessible way of sharing broader 
mental anguish. Only in the 19th century did some authorities start arguing that religion 
itself could cause madness, part of a fundamental split between religion and science that we 
nowadays take for granted. 
Similarly, care in the community is not a modern invention. There were almost no 
institutional places prior to 1800 and those were more likely to be private than public. 
Virtually all care was in the community. Even during the heyday of asylums in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, Scotland preferred boarding out to institutional care, not only for the 
mentally disordered (especially those with LD), but also for the poor and orphans. This tells 
us that the social and political ethos in Scotland (and Wales, by the way) was different from 
that prevailing in England. It also suggests that certain types of society were more accepting 
of the unfortunate or disadvantaged in communities. We might ask why - and whether this 
can be reproduced in environments where we find stigma and a lack of acceptance, or 
whether it is easier to achieve in communities, which are already accepting. 
I began this essay in the knowledge that the value of history might not be 
immediately apparent. But every mental health professional spends a good deal of time 
with service users, making sense of the present by reference to the past: in other words, by 
compiling case histories, weeding out what matters from what does not, the consistent 
from the inconsistent, indicators from contra-indicators. Practitioners build up a plausible 
picture of the mental world and physical environment of their patients. In other words, they 
are historians. So how can mental health professionals use the skills that history teaches? 
It is surely tempting to reify modern concepts and theories of mental disorder and to 
imagine that there is “something real, concrete, permanent and trans-historical about 
them” (Ion & Beer, 2003, 238). Hardly any diagnostic terms in use today existed before 
1900. Who now has heard of neurasthenia? Others that did exist meant something 
different. Dementia, for example, could be used to describe any degenerative mental 
disorder. We assume that we are at the pinnacle of scientific understanding, poised to 
uncover evidence of the genetic basis of many mental disorders: biomedicine triumphant. 
But we may be reluctant to accept that our predecessors were just as convinced of their 
understandings and just as committed to doing the best they could for their patients. It is 
only too easy to judge people, harder to understand why they used a therapy, and tougher 
still to accept that their reasons were as valid as our own. Many things happened in the past 
which we find unpalatable, but the fact that they could happen does not prove that they 
did: the past is not a theatre of horrors, but a place where people did things differently with 
limited resources and, often, the best of intentions.  
Knowledge is contingent: if we assume anything else, we risk ceasing to develop. We 
all have a place in time: we are the precipitates of a deep past, which is not quite past. By 
understanding it we gain a clearer sense of the present and a better chance of planning 
successfully for the future. Saying the past was worse tends to help legitimate modern 
practice, saying it was better is an invitation to change: in both cases we need an accurate 
notion of what historical experience was really like. History helps to hone an informed 
scepticism about the arguments around present day policy because many of the debates we 
regard as peculiar to the here and now are, in fact, timeless. The tension between the 
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